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SURVEY OF
1953 WISCONSIN LEGISLATION
DONALD GRIFFIN JR.* DOUGLAS J. MCCLELLAND**
AND DARRELL L. PECK***
(Editors Note: This article does not cover changes in the
Wisconsin Business Corporations Law, the creation of the Wis-
consin Nonstock Corporations Law, the adoption of the Un-
iform Trust Receipts Act, nor revision of Tax Statutes. These
will be treated in separate articles to appear in the near future
in the MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW.)
The Wisconsin Legislature passed 687 new laws. This article pre-
sents an attempt to give the Wisconsin attorney a concise report of
the most important of these new laws, noting and discussing the
changes in statute law and the effect, if any, of such changes on Wis-
consin case law. The laws discussed herein were chosen on the basis
of their importance with respect to the magnitude of the changes
wrought, effect on case or prior statute law and practical value to
attorneys in the field. As herein used, and unless indicated otherwise,
all references to "section" are to the Wisconsin Statutes and to
"chapter" are to the 1953 Wisconsin Session Laws. This is the second
Legislative Survey to appear in the Marquette Law Review as a bien-
nial feature. Comments, criticisms and suggestions for improving the
survey of 1955 legislation are always welcome.
The discussions have been grouped into thirteen sections, as fol-
lows, and are cross-referenced wherever possible for the convenience
of the reader.
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CORPORATIONS
Exempted Sales of Securities. Section 189.07(15), which
provides that the sale of its securities by one corporation to another
need not be registered under section 189.13, has been enlarged.' The
sale by one corporation to another of the securities of a company in
which it has a controlling interest has also been expressly exempted
from registration. The exemption, as before, applies only when there
is no public offering of the securities and the .sale is to no more than
five corporations.
Co-operatives. Co-operative associations have been authorized
by an amendment to section 185.081 to issue both voting and non-
voting common stock.2 Up to this time there had been only one class
of common stock in any co-operative association, and every holder
of such stock was entitled to vote.3
Savings and Loan Associatios. Chapter 613 of the 1953
Session Laws has made several minor changes in the law governing
Savings and Loan Associations.
CREDITORS RIGHTS
Notice for Issue of Execution. Chapter 365 of the Laws of 1953
amends section 272.04(1) relating to the time within which execution
on judgments must be issued. Under the prior statute if no execution
was issued within five years, or if application was made by one other
than the judgment creditor, notice had to be given to the judgment
debtor prior to the issuance of the execution. Such notice was to be
served as a summons.is served in a court of record. The amendment
allows service of the notice by publication, or as the court may direct,
if the judgment debtor is absent or a non-resident. The amendment
appears to be calculated to provide a method of obtaining service
on a person who cannot be served in Wisconsin, while keeping such
service within the bounds of "due process" as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.'
Carriers Lien for Storage or Transportation. Section 171.07(1)
to (4) has been amended by Chapter 457 of the Laws of 1953. Prior
to the amendement the lien provided for in section 171.07 was for the
benefit of a railroad company alone. Now any common carrier has a
lien on goods for storage or transportation charges. The lien also
extends to goods left in a checkroom or parcel locker which is on the
'Chapter 124.
2 Chapter 301.
3 Wis. STATS. (1951), §185.09. Chapter 301 also amended this section to conform
to the provisions of the new section 185.081.
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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premises of a carrier. In order to enforce the lien, the carrier must
give at least ten days' notice by mail of the amount of the charges.
Previously, notice was required but no definite time was prescribed.
Section 171.07(2) (b) now provides for the handling of property
which is not perishable and has been left on the premises of the com-
mon carrier but not stored with it. The common carrier shall store
the goods, subject to the order of the owner, and after sixty days
may sell the goods at public auction, subject to the provisions of 171.07
(2) (a). Before the creation of this subsection, provision had been
made for the disposal of goods left on the carrier's premises but not
stored.2 The carrier may now dispose of the goods in accordance
with the statute, without being subject to an action for conversion if
the owner claimed the goods at some time in the future. Under sec-
tion 171.06, the common carrier had to wait one year before dis-
posing of the unclaimed goods. In many cases the cost of storage,
as well as the expense of the proceedings taken, were in excess of
the value of the goods. The carrier had no adequate proceedings to
take which would prevent unnecessary expense. Now, the carrier
can dispose of the goods at auction after sixty days with little expense.
Contents of Garnishee Summons. Chapter 485 of the Laws of
1953 amends section 304.23 of the statutes, relating to the contents
of garnishee summons in justice court. The amendment allows the
justice to order the garnishee to retain the property in his possession
pending its disposition according to law. This change also applies to
a warrant of attachment. The amendment will provide more certainty
as to the duties of the garnishee when he receives the summons. The
liability of the garnishee under section 304.25 df the statutes is un-
changed. The change merely provides the garnishee with clear notice
of his duties.
Release of Certain Liens. Chapter 492 creates section 289.085
of the statutes, relating to the release of mechanics liens. The person,
against whom the lien is claimed, may file, with the clerk of court
in whose office the claim for lien is filed, an undertaking executed
by two or more sureties that he will pay the amount of the lien. In
lieu of this undertaking, the person, against whom the lien is filed,
may deposit with the clerk of court a sum of money, certified check
or negotiable United States government bonds equal to 125 per cent
of the claim for lien. The depositor is entitled to any income from
the deposit. The person, against whom the lien is claimed, shall serve
upon the lien claimant a notice of the filing of such undertaking or
deposit, which shall state where and when the undertaking or de-
posit was filed. Any action brought after the furnishing of security
2WIs. STATS. (1951) §171.06.
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is to proceed as if no security had been furnished. After the time
has run for taking exception to the sufficiency of the security, ten
days after notice of the filing, the clerk shall satisfy the claim for
lien of record and discharge any Us pendens. When the lien or lis
pendens is discharged, it shall attach to the security furnished.
The newly created section of the statutes will speed up the con-
veyancing procedures. A vendor will be able to pass title to realty even
though there may be claims which ordinarily would be a cloud on
title. The common practice has been to secure a release of any lien
from the claimant. In many cases a claim may be contested as to the
amount due a contractor or other claimant and no release can be ob-
tained. Under the new section, marketable title may be conveyed by
a vendor before the amount due a lien claimant is settled. The amount
due is certain to be paid since the undertaking must be sufficient to
pay the amount claimed, plus all costs and'damages, or the deposit
in lieu of the undertaking must equal 125 per cent of the amount
claimed.
CRIMINAL LAW
Probation of Juveniles. Chapter 70 created 48.02(7) which
gives the juvenile court of a county the right to place juveniles on
probation to the state department of public welfare if that depart-
ment has certified to that court that it has adequate personnel and
facilities in that county.
Chapter 74 amended 176.32(1) and now allows one under twenty-
one years of age to enter and be on licensed premises where intoxicat-
ing liquor is sold if accompanied by a spouse who is twenty-one years
of age.' This chapter also provides for a mandatory penalty, in case
of offense, on the keeper of the premises, of a fine of not more than
$250.00 or imprisonment not exceeding sixty days and on the person
remaining of a fine of not more than twenty dollars and imprisonment
not exceeding thirty days.2
Sentences. Chapter 97 created 359.051(5) which allows a court
to impose as many sentences as there are convictions and provides
that these may be served consecutively to each other and/or to a
sentence now being served and if the defendant is sentenced to the
state prison and a county jail on separate counts, they shall be served
concurrently unless the court orders otherwise. 3
135 O.A.G. 339 held that such a minor spouse could not enter such premises
since the spouse over twenty-one was not a guardian and did not stand
loco parentis.
2Previously these parties were only liable to such fines and imprisonment.
S WIs. STATS. (1951) §359.051 deals with intermediate sentences, reformatory
and home for women. See also, 34 O.A.G. 163 (1945); Application of
McDonald, 178 Wis. 167, 189 N.W. 1029 (1922).
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Punishment for Escape. Chapter 177 created 346.40(5) which
establishes a two year extension on the term of the original commit-
ment of one who was transferred to the Wisconsin school for boys
or to the Wisconsin home for women from the Wisconsin school
for girls and who escapes from custody or attempts to escape by
violence or assaults the superintendent or other employees of the in-
stitution.
Sales of Meat. Chapter 200 repealed and recreated 97.55 which
relates to meat from dead or diseased animals. The first subsection
states the previous law in precise language. The second subsection
states that no carcass meat is to be fed to animals used for human
consumption unless rendered and cooked, and the third subsection
limits the first to animals with diseases which ordinarily render such
meat unfit for human consumption and states that as to other animals
subsection one shall not apply if animals are slaughtered under super-
vision of a veterinary meat inspector at an approved slaughtering
establishment. Chapter 208 created 97.555 and 97.72(4) which per-
mit the selling of horsemeat only if conspicuously labeled as such
and provides a penalty in case of violation.
Interference With Public Assistance. Chapter 376 amended
49.12(2) relating to interference with the administration of public
assistance and expressly included acceptance of supplies given to any
person as general relief in exchange for or in payment of intoxicating
liquors as a violation, though violations under 49.12(2) are not
limited to such acts.
Chapter 481 amends 52.25 as amended and renumbered by Chapter
31 and gives to the district attorney power on complaint by a woman,
who has borne an illegitmate child or is pregnant with a child which
when born may be illegitimate, accusing a named person of being
the father to take such complaint in writing under oath of such woman
and issue his warrant and it shall be returnable before a magistrate
of the county.4
Remand for Preliminary Examination. Chapter 538 created
355.18(2) which gives the trial court discretion to remand a cause to
the magistrate for a preliminary examination on a motion on good
cause shown. Good cause is defined as:
1. Preliminary examination was waived; and
2. Defendent had not had advice of counsel prior to such waiver;
and
4 Formerly only the justice of the peace had this power and the warrant was
returnable to him. Now both the justice of the peace and the district attorney
may issue such warrant.
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3. Defendant denies there is probable cause to hold him for trial;
and
4. Defendant intends to plead not guilty.5
Sale of Narcotics. Chapter 566 amended 161.02(2) so that any
one selling or dispensing narcotic drugs to one under twenty-one
years of age shall be imprisoned from three years up to twenty-five
years6 and a third conviction on such offense carries with it life im-
prisonment. It amended 161.02(3) and increased the imprisonment
and treatment of an habitual addict to two years. It also amended
161.275 and increased the fine for growing, possessing or selling
marijuana to from $250.00 to $5000.00 and the imprisonment to from
one to ten years.
Public Nuisance. Section 348.092(4) and (5) were created by
Chapter 447 and declare that gambling and gambling houses or
buildings which are prohibited in this state are public nuisances and
subject to abatement. In case two or more offenses of keeping
a gambling house have been committed in any house, place, or building,
that house, place, or building is declared a public nuisance and is sub-
ject to be enjoined and abated under sections 280.09 to 280.15.
Pre-sentence Examination. Under section 340.485(1) created
by chapter 542 of the 1951 Session laws a person convicted of
particular sex crimes was mandatorily committed to the department
of public welfare for a presentence social, physical and medical ex-
amination. An offense under section 340.47, carnal knowledge and
abuse, was one of those crimes. This examination was demanded
in those cases even when the obvious sentence was probation and in
practice was accomplished by a sixty day examination at the state
prison in Waupun except for cases in Milwaukee County. Section
340.485 (1) was amended by chapter 85 to eliminate an offense under
section 340.47 from the group of crimes where such examination is
mandatory. So section 340.485(2) which makes such an examination
a matter in the discretion of the court in case of all other sex crimes
applies also to carnal knowledge and abuse cases.
Cross Reference:
MOTOR VEHICLES: Miscellaneous.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Marriageable Age of Consent. Section 245.02, which sets the
legal age of those who may contract marriage has been extended
5 WIs. STATS. (1951) §355.18(1) states no information is to be filed until the
party has had a preliminary examination unless he waives it except in the
case of fugitives from justice and corporations. Remedy for the defendant
if an information is filed without said examination is motion to dismiss.
6 The law before amendment had imprisonment from three to ten years and
no other provision.
1953-54]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
to include males under the age of eighteen, as limited by an ammend-
ment to section 245.16.1 This amendment allows a male under
eighteen to "lawfully contract to marry and obtain a marriage lic-
ense if he first obtains the written permission of the county judge
of his county, who shall grant permission only if he finds that
the marriage will prevent a child fathered by the applicant from
being born out of wedlock." Previously, the marriage of a male under
eighteen years of age was voidable at his option unless he confirmed
it after reaching the legal age of consent. 2 Court interpretation un-
doubtedly would hold the marriage of a male under eighteen who
had obtained permission of the county judge in compliance with the
amendment a valid marriage and not a voidable one.
Support of Dependents. Chapter 52 of the statutes has been
created and entitled Support of Dependents. 3 Actually this new chap-
ter is made up entirely of sections previously found elsewhere in
the statutes. It includes parts of Chapter 49 (Public Assistance),
Chapter 247 (Divorce), Chapter 351 (Offenses against Chastity,
Morality and Decency) and all of what was formerly Chapter 166
(Illegitimacy). For the most part, the only changes made in any of
the renumbered sections is that the wording has been modernized and
clarified. However, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, which was formerly section 49.135 and is now section 52.10,
was changed considerably.4
This uniform act was adopted by the Wisconsin legislature at
its 1951 session only a few months after it was approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
law, designed to procure enforcement of support decrees without
requiring extradition if the obligor went to another state, was badly
needed and has already been adopted by more than thirty states. and
applied by many courts.5 Application of the law pointed out many
possible improvements. The National Conference amended the law
extensively in 1952,6 and, for the most part, those are the changes
made by the Wisconsin legislature in section 52.10.
A statutory presumption has been created that the person owing
support (obligor) was present in a responding state during the period
for which support is sought.7 This presumption is rebuttable by proof
to the contrary by the obligor, but at least it relieves the person en-
titled to support (obligee) from the burden of proving that the
2 Chapter 8.
2 Swenson v. Swenson, 179 Wis. 536, 192 N.W. 70 (1923).
3 Chapter 31.
' Chapter 247.
5 UNIFoRm REcIPRoCAL ENFORCEMENT.Or SuprorT ACT, 9A U.L.A.6 UNmoRm REcraocAL. ENFORCEMENT OF Suproar ACT (Revised), 9A U.L.A.T Wis. STATS. (1953), §52.10(7).
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obligor was actually present in the responding state, a condition pre-
cedent to jurisdiction over the obligor under the prior act.8
Section 8 of the uniform act has been amended to allow political
subdivisions that have furnished support to the obligee to invoke the
reciprocal law to enforce continued support by the obligor as well
as to secure reimbursement for past expenditures.9 Another addition
provides that a summons and a petition will be used to commence
proceedings to enforce support and further specifies that this is not
an action but a special proceeding.'" Statutory permission has been
granted a petitioner under the act to attach information to the peti-
tion which might help locate or identify the obligor." Provision has
been made to have the district attorney represent the petitioner' 2
and to allow a minor obligee to petition through the person having
legal custody of him without requiring appointment of a guardian
ad litem.1 3 The two latter provisions save the obligee considerable
difficulty since he is usually in serious financial distress after not
having received support money. The court before which the proceed-
ing is brought may also, in its discretion, direct the county to pay costs
and fees of both petitioner and defendent or either.14
Arrest of the defendent obligor has been authorized if the court
believes he may attempt to flee the jurisdiction.' 5 The attorney-general
has been designated as the state information agency to compile a list
of Wisconsin courts with addresses, having jurisdiction under the
act. These are to be mailed to similar agencies in other states having
the Uniform Reciprocal Support of Dependents Act. 6 These state
information agencies see that copies of the petition and other papers
filed in the courts of another state are forwarded to the proper
court in their own state which can obtain jurisdiction over the
obligor.17 That court, upon receiving the petition, may proceed to
obtain jurisdiction over the obligor or his property. Even though the
petition is inaccurate or inadequate, the court may continue the case
pending correction and make its own efforts to trace the obligor or
his property.' 8
By these amendments to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, the primary purpose of the act, to allow the obligee
to obtain jurisdiction over an obligor who has gone to another state
8 Subsection 4.
9 Subsection 8.
10 Subsection 9.
11 Subsection 10.
12 Subsection 11.
13 Subsection 12.14 Subsection 14.
15 Subsection 15.
16 Subsection 16.
17 Subsection 13.
Is Subsection 18.
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by filing a petition in the obligee's own state, has been greatly facil-
itated.
Marriage of Epileptics. The word "epileptic" has finally been
removed from the statute listing those who are not capable of con-
tracting marriage.19 Because the marriage of such persons had been
absolutely void up to the time of this amendment,20 a companion
amendment was enacted making "all marriages, otherwise valid
and legal, contracted prior to April 24, 1953, to which either party
was an epileptic person" valid and legal "in all respects as though such
marriages had been duly and legally contracted in the first instance."' 21
These changes also do away with a long standing inconsistency which
made the marriage of an epileptic void and yet did not list epilepsy
as a ground for annulment of marriage.2 2
Wasserman Tests. The authority to make Wasserman tests and
chemical examinations has been transferred from the Wisconsin
psychiatric institute to the state laboratory of hygiene.23 These duties
are much more consistent with the purposes and other duties of the
state laboratory than they were with those of the psychiatric institute.
Guardian ad litem in Adoption. Section 322.04(9), which re-
quires the appointment and consent of a guardian ad litem for a
minor or incompetent parent when the child of such a parent is to
be adopted, has been amended to allow previous adoptions, which
are invalid only because no guardian ad litem concurred in the con-
sent of the minor parent, to be validated. This is to be done by the
filing of a petition stating that the minor parent was represented by
a duly licensed attorney at the time of giving her consent and that
the child has remained with the adoptive parents for more than five
years.2
4
In the original amendment, the legislature also provided that the
consent of a guardian ad litem was no longer necessary for a minor
parent when she was represented by a duly licensed attorney at the
time of giving her consent, but this provision was removed by chapter
612. Without the provision eliminating the requirement of the guard-
ian s consent, the apparent result is that, under section 322.04(9) (a),
the adoption is not effective without such consent. 25 However, after
19 Wis. STATS. (1953), §245.03(1) was amended by chapter 63.
20 In re Cannon's Estate, 221 Wis. 322, 266 N.W. 918 (1936) ; Note, 12 Wis. L.
REv. 123 (1936).
21 Wis. STATS. (1953), §245.035 was created by chapter 470.
2ZWIs. STATS. (1953), §245.02.
23 WIS. STATS. (1953), §36.227(6) was repealed by chapter 54 and replaced by
§36.225(4). Other statutes mentioning the psychiatric institute as the agency
to make these tests have been corrected to conform to the amendment.24 Chapter 170.
25In re Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W. 2d 759 (1951).
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the child has lived with the adoptive parents for five years, the adop-
tion can be validated by following the procedure set forth in section
322.04(9) (b).
Cross Reference:
PROPERTY, Sale of Real Estate Awarded Under Divorce Decree.
EVIDENCE
Tender in Usury. Chapter 256 repealed section 115.08 which
made the tender of the principal sum of money loaned a condition
precendent to relief from or plea of usury.1 But even without that
statute the rule of a majority of the courts in the United States is
that the debtor may receive relief only on the condition he pay or at
least offer to pay the principal sum or the prinicpal sum and a legal
amount of interest. 2 So the effect of this repeal is questionable.
Grand Jury Testimony. Chapter 280, section 25, of the 1953
Session Laws amended section 255.24 and renumbered it as section
255.21. It now provides that the transcript of testimony taken before
the grand jury and certified by a grand jury reporter to have been
carefully compared by him with the minutes of the testimony taken
and to be a correct transcript of the same may be received in evidence
with the same effect as his dral testimony to those same facts but he
may be cross-examined by any party as to such facts.3 Previously a
member of the grand jury could be required by a court to testify
only as to whether the testimony of a witness examined before the
grand jury was consistent with or different from the evidence given
by that witness before such a court or they may be required to dis-
close the testimony given before the grand jury by any person upon
a complaint against such person or at his trial for perjury.
Publication as Evidence of Laws. Section 1 of chapter 445
of the 1953 Session Laws amended section 327.01 and added legis-
lative resolutions, senate and assembly journals or orders, rules, reg-
ulations or decisions of any of its boards, departments, commissions or
agencies to those documents which are prima facie evidence that
they are such publictions as they purport to be when they are printed
by the state as copies of such documents. Section 2 of chapter 445
of the 1953 Session Laws includes copies of orders, rules, regula-
tions or decisions of any state or federal board, department, com-
mission or agency to those copies which are prima facie evidence
of such order, rule, or decision when printed by the United States
or any state or territory as copies of such rules. This is under sec-
tion 327.02.
I Hersh v. Smith, 262 Wis. 75, 55 N.W. 2d 769 (1952).
2 55 Am. Jup. Usury 108, 166 A.L.R. 459.
3 Section 16 of Chapter 280 of the 1953 Session Laws establishes the rules for
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Qualifications of Medical Witnesses. Chapter 459 attempts to
revise the rules on admissibility of medical expert testimony, pre-
sumably in response to the problems suggested in Morrill v. Koma-
snski.4 Nonresident experts to be qualified, are now required either
to be licensed to practice medicine or osteopathy in another state or
if not, to offer proof "satisfactory to the court" that they are so
qualified. In either case, the party intending to call such nonresident
expert is required to serve a notice of five days upon the opposing
party, specifically indentifying the nonresident expert proposed to be
called. The express requirement of the old section that such nonresident
expert, called otherwise than as examining or consulting physician, 5
could qualify only where resident experts were unavailable has been
deleted.
Reproduction of Records. Chapter 613 created section 215.91
which allows a savings and loan association to record, copy or re-
produce any of their records by photostat or photographic process
after which the original records may be disposed of with written
consent of the commissioner of savings and loan associations. This
is also applicable to federal savings and loan associations if it does
not contravene federal law. These copies or reproductions are to be
an original record in all courts and administrative agencies for the
purpose of admissibility into evidence. A certified copy or facsimile
of such photographic copy shall be deemed a certified copy or fac-
simile for all purposes.
INSURANCE
Advance Payments. Chapter 56 amended sections 206.39 and
208.27 so as to allow life insurance companies and mutual benefit
societies doing business in this state to collect and receive advance
payments on their policies or certificates as agreed in writing be-
tween the company and its policy holder or the society and its member
and these advancements may be held under trust or under other
written agreement between the parties as are all other proceeds col-
lected under the policy or certificate. The Wisconsin statute made no
provision for advance collections and payments prior to this amend-
ment.
Right of Investment. Chapter 64 extended the rights of domestic
life insurance companies in investing its assets to bonds or other
evidences of indebtedness of any governmental or civil division and
to those not only in the United States but also those in Canada under
the employment of a reporter by the grand jury.
4 Morrill v. Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W. 2d 620 (1949).
5 Wis. STATS. (1951) §147.19.
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sections 206.34(1) (b), 206.34(1) (bm), and 206.34(1) (bn). 1 This
chapter also extended the right of investment in loans secured by
mortgages under section 206.34(1) (c) to include mortgages on real
property in Canada and on leasehold estates on improved property
in the United States and Canada. The limitation in section 206.34
(1) (c) as to amount was increased so that now a loan may not ex-
ceed two-thirds of the fair market value of the property mortgaged.2
That chapter also amended that section's restriction so that when the
value of buildings constitutes part of the security, the buildings must
be insured to an amount which when added to two-thirds of the
value of the land shall equal or exceed the amount of the loan.3 This
chapter also terminated the limitation on section 206.34(1)(ef)
which had restricted investments in evidences of indebtedness of
solvent companies to not more than fifteen per cent of such com-
panies' admitted assets. Section 206.34(1)(k), allowing investment
in the purchase or ownership of real estate, in the United States or
Canada, which produces income or will produce income by improve-
ment, was created. This new section is limited to an aggregate invest-
ment not exceeding five percent of the admitted assets of the company.
Supplemental Insurance. Medical payment insurance has been
broadened, in section 201.04(18) by chapter 418 as a type of in-
surance authorized to be written, to cover expense in connection with
liability, burglary, steam boiler and elevator insurance except loss
of time and in connection with automobile insurance to cover loss,
damage and expense, including loss of time, which arises from
injury, disease or death of the insured and others by accident.4 Under
such insurance policies the insurer agrees to pay without regard to
the insured's legal liability. Policies issued under this section are
not required to fulfill the conditions of sections 204.31 and 204.32
which set up the requirements for accident and sickness policies
and group accident and health policies when they are issued as sup-
plemental to other policies of section 201.04 provided that the "loss,
damage or expense arises out of a hazard directly related to such
other insurance."
Cross Reference:
MOTOR VEHILCLES, Miscellaneous.
MOTOR VEHICLES, Safety Responsibility Law.
I For a governmental or civil division to be included there had been a population
minimum of five thousand persons and there had also been the requirement
that these divisions were in the United States.
2 The previous limitation was fifty per cent of the fair market value.
3 The insurance on the buildings was previously added to fifty per cent of the
value of the land.
4Under the former section "loss of time" expressly was excluded from this
subsection regardless of the type of policy it was written with.
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PRACTICE AND PROCEEDURE, Service of Process on Domestic In-
surance Companies.
MOTOR VEHICLES
Stopping for a School Bus. The old section 85.16(12), limiting
the speed of vehicles overtaking and passing a school bus stopped
on the highway to fifteen miles per hour, was deemed insufficient pro-
tection to the children involved. Chapter 180 substitutes the require-
ment that such overtaking or meeting vehicles stop and wait to pass
the bus until the bus resumed motion or the driver has signaled for
the vehicle to proceed. This new section 85.16(12) is limited in that
it does not apply to business or residential districts nor to vehicles
proceeding in the opposite direction on the opposite side of a divided
highway. But even now the bus driver has the duty to drive in such
a manner and with due care so as to permit the flow of traffic without
undue interruption.
Speedometer, Directional Lights, and Rear Fenders. Before
this 1953 session of the legislature, there was no requirement that
an automobile had to be equipped with a speedometer. Chapter 224
created section 85.67(7) requiring a speedometer on every motor
vehicle designed primarily for use on the highway when it is operated
on the highway. Chapter 472 created section 85.45(6) requiring all
motor vehicles except those with dump bodies be equipped wiith
rear fenders capable of restricting the splash of mud and water on
vehicles following or in lieu thereof, mud guards must be provided.
However, this was later amended by chapter 680 so that only privately
owned straight trucks or semi-trailers drawn by a truck tractor in
intercity movement need be so equipped. The standards for the
fenders or mud guards shall be determined by the motor vehicle de-
partment. The old section 85.06(15) (a) permitted any vehicle to
be equipped with directional lights and under section 85.175 a driver
was required to signal for a turn by hand and arm or by such
mechanical or electrical signal. Chapter 297 amended 85.06(15) (a) and
provides that all new motor vehicles sold in Wisconsin after January
1, 1955, must be equipped with directional lights. The ultimate goal
of the legislature seems to be to have all vehicles equipped with direc-
tional signals and ultimately to do away with manual signals entirely.
Duty of Disclosure. Section 85.08(25b) now repealed, had placed
a duty upon a judge taking the plea of one charged with a violation
requiring revocation or suspension of a driver's license to inform
the defendent of such consequence of the plea. No such warning was
provided, as a practical matter, where the defendant elected to forfeit
bail without personally appearing before the judge. Chapter 254
created 85.08(24b) which requires either the arresting officer or the
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district attorney, in such cases, to inform the violator that forfeiture
of bail will result in revocation or suspension, and such violator must
sign a stipulation to the fact that he was so informed. Now unless such
stipulation has been filed with the court, no bail shall be forfeited.
Weight Limitation. The weight limitations in sections 85.47
and 85.48 had been held not to apply to state, county, or municipal
vehicles.' But chapter 404 created section 85.465 which makes these
limitations applicable to state, county, and municipal vehicles un-
less they are being used for the removal, treatment, and sanding of
ice and snow. This section is limited further by section 85.53(6)
which allows the officer in charge of maintenance to permit loads in
excess of the weight limitations to be hauled for good cause for con-
struction or maintenance operations.
Occupational License. Although chapter 338 amended section
85.08(25c) (a) relating to occupational licenses, it is only a reword-
ing and rephrasing of the old section and in no way changes the sub-
stantive or procedural law.
Rules for Passing. Section 85.16(6) had prohibited passing
another vehicle at railroad grade crossings and highway intersec-
tions unless a traffic officer allows it or the highway is properly marked
by traffic lanes.2 Chapter 535 amended section 85.16(6) and limited
its application to intersections on rural highways only when those
intersections are designated by proper signs. The reason for this
change was the difficulty one had in attempting to pass other vehicles
on a highway which numerous other roads crossed. This new section
in effect empowers the state highway commission to erect signs which
will estiblish those intersetcions at which passing is not allowed.3
Foreign Licensed Motor Vehicles. Chapter 593 repealed and
recreated section 85.05 which exempts nonresidents from the laws
of Wisconsin providing for registration and taxation of motor veh-
icles to the same extent as similar exemptions are granted residents
of this state under the laws of the state or foreign country of such
nonresident if such nonresident has complied with the laws of his
state as to registration and displays a legal registration plate from
that state. This section also empowers the commissioner of the motor
vehicle department to make reciprocal agreements with other states
and foreign countries concerning licenses, permits, fees, mileage taxes
and other items. The most noteworthy changes this chapter made
were the repeal of sections 85.05(3) and 85.05(2) (a). The first of
these was the section which made a nonresident's use and operation
141 O.A.G. 65 (1952).
2 Kaestner v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. 257 Wis. 6. 42 N.W. 2d 260 (1949);
Topham v. Casey, 262 Wis. 580, 55 N.W. 2d 892 (1952).3 WIs. STATS. (1951) §86.19(2).
1953-54]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of a motor vehicle over the highways of Wisconsin an irrevocable
appointment of the commissioner of the motor vehicle department
for the service of process. The reason for this repeal was very ques-
tionable especially in the light of recent legislation,4 and the fall ses-
sion of the legislature reenacted it in chapter 648. The second sec-
tion which was repealed dealt with the "single trip" privilege.5
Powers Granted. Prior to this amendment by section 60.18(12)
a town meeting could direct the town board in towns with a popula-
tion of five hundred persons or more and having one or more unin-
corporated villages to exercise all the powers given a village board
by chapter 61. Without this direction, a town board had no authority
to establish speed ordinances and enforce them for section 60.29,
which lists the powers of a town board, does not list such power. But
village boards by section 61.34 do have power of regulations of village
highways for the safety, health, and welfare of the public.6 Section
81.01(1) enumerates the duties of a town board over state highways
but does not list that power. So chapter 313 amended section 60.18
(12) to allow a town meeting to direct the town board in all towns to
exercise the powers relating to the adoption and enforcement of speed
ordinances conferred on village boards. This enables a town meeting
to give the town board this particular power without conferring all
the powers of a village board on the town boards and it enables the
town meeting of any town to do it.
Section 85.831 was created by chapter 348 and permits local ordi-
nances complying with the provisions of chapter 85 to contain a pro-
vision for stipulation of guilt. If this stipulation is timely made and
the amount of the penalty is paid to the designated official, the per-
son charged need not appear in court and no additional costs shall
be taxed to him unless the local ordinance so provides. Some cities
already have allowed stipulation of guilt for offenses other than those
under chapter 85 of the statutes.7 This section gives local authorities
a positive basis on which they can allow a stipulation of guilt under
an ordinance which complies with chapter 85 of the statutes.
Chapter 529 created section 66.95 empowering the governing body
4Tarezynski v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 261 Wis.
149, 52 N.W. 2d 396 (1952); Ullman v. Frege, 263 Wis. 199, 56 N.W. 2d 821(1952) ; Feinsenger v. Bard, 195 F.2d 45 (7th Cir., 1952).
541 O.A.G. 86 (1952).
6 This power is limited by section 85.40 which sets up state speed regulations
and the local authority's power in regard to those regulations and by section
85.84 which allows any local authority to pass any rule or ordinance in strict
conformity with Chapter 85 of the STATUTES except as to revocation and
suspension of license.
7 Milwaukee Code of Ordinances §§101-105 provide for stipulation of guilt in
cases of violations of certain parking restrictions, of the duty to signal a turn,
and of city ordinances by pedestrians including midstreet crossing, and
crossing intersections against the signal light.
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of any city to enact ordinances requiring that motor vehicles be
equipped with a lock for the throttle, gear shift, or ignition and pro-
hibiting one from leaving a vehicle on a street without locking the
lock and removing the key. Section 85.915 was created by chapter
534 and empowers a trial court to order in addition to other penalties
of section 85.91 that the one convicted attend a traffic safety school
approved by the commissioner of the motor vehicle department. Prior
to these sections there was no statutory authority for either of these
acts.
Safety Responsibility Law. Sections 85.09(7) (b) and 85.09(10)
(c) formerly made the duration of suspension of a license and car
registration and the duration of withholding of security deposited
last until one year elapsed after the date of the accident and no notice
had been filed with the commissioner by any claimant in thirteen
months that an action had been instituted by a party in interest by
actual service of the summons in the one year period. But a ques-
tion arose concerning the interpretation of the commissioner includ-
ing counterclaim or cross complaint filed subsequent to the expira-
tion of the one year limitation.8 Chapter 255 amended those sections
so that an action instituted by actual service of counterclaim or cross-
complaint as well as of summons will defeat the right to a return
of the security deposited and the suspended license and registration
if such service is made within a year of the accident.9 Chapter 339
amended sections 85.09(1)(j), 85.09(5)(c) and 85.09(21)(b)(2) to
require that when proof of ability to respond in damages for liability
in a motor vehicle accident is based on an insurance policy, the
amounts covered by such policy must be ten thousand dollars for
injury or death to one person, twenty thousand dollars for injury
or death to two or more persons and five thousand dollars for in-
jury to or destruction of property of others in one accident to
satisfy the requirements of section 85.09. The amounts previously
required were five thousand dollars, ten thousand dollars, and one
thousand dollars respectively. This chapter raised the amount of de-
posit necessary for a certificate of responsibility from the state
treasurer to twenty-five thousand dollars instead of eleven thousand
dollars under section 85.09(25)(b). Under the former section 85.09
(6) (d) which established the exceptions to the times when security
is required under section 85.09, any evidence filed with the commis-
sioner of motor vehicles which would satisfy him that the person
who would otherwise have to file security had been released from
liability was sufficient. Chapter 546 amended that section to expressly
include a release from liability executed by a parent as a natural
839 O.A.G. 462 (1950).
9 Ibid.
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guardian for a minor child in respect to property damage or personal
injury by the child if the total damage does not exceed two hundred
dollars; provided, if there is personal injury, a doctor's certificate
of injury must be filed with the motor vehicle department certifying
that the minor received no permanent injury. Although there were
no cases on whether a parent could previously sign such a release,
the practice was to require execution of such release by a duly ap-
pointed guardian ad litem, requiring commencement of an action
in even small cases.
Chapter 482 created section 85.09(8) which makes the Wisconsin
safety responsibility law a reciprocal law.
Miscellaneous. Chapter 302 amended section 218.01 which
formerly stated that a "finance charge" meant "that part of the total
price of a retail installment contract in excess of the cash price, and
includes, unless otherwise specified, the insurance premium if any."
This is now called the "time price differential" and the section specifi-
cally states all the charges which may be included but excludes in-
surance premiums. This chapter also amended section 218.01(6) (b)
to set up a maximum time price differential for particular classes of
motor vehicles and recreated section 218.01(6) (c) which now pro-
vides that at the time the buyer signs the installment sales contract
he is to receive an exact copy of that contract and all notes given in
the transaction. That copy of the contract must contain the seller's
signature identical with that on the original contract. Previously
that statute demanded that an exact copy of the contract and notes be
sent to the buyer within five days of the sale. This chapter also
created section 85.09(5)(e) under which in the case of a retail sale
of a motor vehicle under a retail installment contract in which pro-
vision is made for insurance or a charge is made to cover it, the
policy so issued must include public liability coverage for the driver
in the case of negligence or the seller shall in writing notify the buyer
when the contract is made that the vehicle is not covered by public
liability insurance. That is a new requirement under Wisconsin statutes,
but there is some authority for the fact that the notice required by
section 85.09(5)(e) may be combined with a conditional sales con,-
tract form and need not be a separate instrument.1 Section 85.45
(2) (c) was amended by chapter 582 to raise the maximum overall
length of a combination of vehicles from forty-five to fifty feet and
now to except specifically a mobile home from that limit and set its
limit at forty-five feet alone or sixty feet in combination."' Chapter
650 created sections 85.08(12)(f) which establishes a fine or im-
prisonment or both for one required to be examined for an operator's
1042 O.A.G. 208 (1953).
11 For other changes concerning mobile homes see Chapter 563.
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license who by any means secures the services of another to take his
place and 85.08(12) (g) which establishes punishment for the per-
son so appearing. Chapter 578 created sections 370.01(50), (51), and
(52) which define the terms "controlled access highway," "express
highway" and "freeway."
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Officials and Appointees of the Court. Section 252.14(1),"
dealing with court commissioners, and section 324.29(2) ,2 dealing
with guardians ad litem, have been amended to require that such
persons hereafter appointed by the court to serve in those capacities
must be attorneys licensed to practice in this state.
The judges of the municipal courts for both the eastern and the
western districts of Waukesha county have been given the powers
and duties of court commissioners.3 Appointment of retired circuit
judges as conciliators has been authorized in counties having a popu-
lation of 500,000 or more. These conciliators may also be appointed
court commissioners.4
The number of assistant divorce counsels authorized in counties
having a population of 500,000 or more has been increased from only
one to as many "as the county board shall determine and authorize."5'
The office of "calendar deputy clerk" has been created in all coun-
ties having a population of 250,000 or more.6 The duties of this new
clerk are to be prescribed by the circuit court judges in the county.
Discovery examinations in counties having a population in excess
of 500,000 must be taken before either a court commissioner or a
judge in chambers. 7 In other counties, discovery examinations may
still be taken before any authorized officer.
Service of Process on Domestic Insurance Companies. A
summons may now be validly served on a domestic insurance com-
pany by delivering a copy "to any agent of such corporation as de-
fined by the insurance laws of this state," but this "shall not be
deemed valid service unless a true copy of such service shall be sent
by registered mail to the principal place of business of such corpora-
tion within 5 days after service upon such agent. . . ."s Service on
other domestic corporations must still be by service on one of the
officers enumerated in the statute.9
1 Chapter 100.
2 Chapter 107.
s Chapter 20 and Chapter 19, respectively.
4WIs. STATS. (1953), §269.70 was created by chapter 610.
5 Wis. STATS. (1953), §247.13(2) was amended by chapter 34.
6 Wis. STATs. (1953), §59.38 'was amended by chapter 155.
7 Wis. STATS. (1953), §326.12(3) was amended by chapter 371.8 Wis. STATs. (1953), §262.09(3) was amended by chapter 48.
9 Wis. STATs. (1953), §262.09(3).
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Maintenance and Champerty. The defenses of maintenance and
champerty have been abrogated in all cases except where the cham-
pertous contract itself is the basis of the suit.10
Term of Office. A justice of the supreme court or a judge of the
circuit court who was elected to fill a vacancy occuring before the
expiration of a regular term has, up to this time, served only the
remainder of that term. This frequently has necessitated a costly
election to fill the office for only a short time. The legislature has
remedied this by providing that such judge or justice shall serve a
full term after his election.1'
Changes in State Judicial Structure. Chapter 327 of the 1953
Session Laws has added another branch to the Second Judicial Cir-
cuit in Milwaukee county. This new court, the Tenth Branch, is to
be financed by an increased suit tax. The civil court of Milwaukee
county has been changed from a municipal to an inferior court.' 2
The municipal court of Manitowoc county has been divided into
two branches by creation of a circuit court branch.' 3
Jurisdictional changes have been made in the following courts:
county court of Marquette county,' 4 county court of Shawano
county, 5 county court of Chippewa county,16 county court of Wal-
worth county,17 county court of La Crosse county,' 8 county court of
Monroe county,19 county court of Green county,20 and county court
of Washington county.21
Criminal jurisdiction of justices of the peace has been increased
in certain cases when the defendent enters a plea of guilty. 22 Counties
on the shore of any inland lake have been given jurisdiction in com-
mon of all offenses committed on any part of the lake.23
Costs and Fees. The suit tax has been increased from $1 to $5
to help pay the state's share of the costs of the new Tenth Branch
of the Second Judicial Circuit.24 The fees to be collected by the clerks
of the circuit courts,'2 5 clerk of the civil court of Milwaukee county,26
10 WIs. STATS. (1953), §331.375 was created by chapter 293.
-Wis. STATS. (1953), §17.19(2) was amended by chapter 606.
12 Chapter 493
'1 Chapter 125.
14 Chapter 22.
'15 Chapter 86.16 Chapter 195.
'T Chapter 211.
Is Chapter 379.
'9 Chapter 455.
20 Chapter 469.
21 Chapter 609.
22WIs. STATS. (1953), §360.01(5) (b) was created by chapter 573.
23 WIs. STATS. (1953), §2.04 was amended by chapter 506.
24WIs. STATS. (1953), §59.39(11) was amended by chapter 327.
25 WIs. STATS. (1953), §59.42 was repealed and recreated by chapter 511. In
addition, extensive amendments were made in the fall session by chapter 662.
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and justices of the peace27 have also been increased. The amount of
expert witness fees and attorney fees includible in the cost awarded
the prevailing party in the civil court of Milwaukee county has also
been increased. 28
Cross Reference:
CREDITORS RIGHTS, Contents of Garnishee Summons.
CREDITORS RIGHTS, Notice for Issue of Execution.
C umiNAL LAw, Remand for Preliminary Examination.
DoMEsTIc RELATIONS, Guardian ad litem in Adoption.
MOTOR VEHICLES, Foreign Licensed Motor Vehicles.
TORTS, Notice of Injury.
TORTS, Service on Owner of Water-Craft.
WILLS AND PROBATE, Time for Filing Claims.
PROPERTY
Requirements of a Valid Conveyance. Chapter 428 has amended
section 235.01(1) to state that conveyances may be acknowledged and
executed in the presence of two witnesses but that the absence of this
acknowledgement or witnessing dos not affect the validity of the
conveyance but only its recordability. This has been case law in Wis-
consin for many years.' The amendment makes no provision for the
validation of unsealed conveyances.
2
Discharging Noxious Matter into Surface Waters. Section
146.13(2) was created by chapter 443 and prohibits any person from
discharging untreated domestic sewage into surface waters or drainage
ditches, from discharging pumpage from any septic tank, dry well or
cesspool into surface waters or drainage ditches and provides a
penalty.
Removal of Restrictive Covenants. Chapter 545 has created
section 281.30 which gives a statutory method of removing certain
restrictive covenants affecting the use of certain city real estate if
all or part of a city block is affected by restrictive deed provisions
and when the first restriction on the property existed for thirty years
Section 59.42 now appears to establish the fees for all courts of record and
does not seem to be limited to the circuit courts. Strictly interpreted, this
would make fees in the civil court of Milwaukee county identical with those
of the circuit court, an enormous increase. An opinion of the attorney-general
has been requested on this provision and a test case has been started to compel
the clerk of the civil court to accept the old fee.
26 Chapter 580.
27 WIs. STATS. (1953), §307.01 was amended by chapter 574.
28 Chapter 580.
1 This merely restates what has been case law in Wisconsin since two early
Wisconsin cases; Myreth v. McMillan, 13 Wis. 188 (1860) and Leinenkugel
v. Kehl, 73 Wis. 238, 40 N.W. 683 (1888).
2 The effect of an unsealed deed is discussed in Dreutzer v. Boker, 60 Wis. 179,
18 N.W. 776 (1884). The curative statute on unsealed deeds is section 235.18.
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and when seventy-five per cent or more of the area in that city
block has not been developed with buildings allowed by the restric-
tion. While this gives an owner of such city land under such circum-
stances an affirmative right, it has been held for some time in Wis-
consin that:
"Courts of Equity will not enforce such restrictive covenants
when the character of the neighborhood has so changed as to
make it impossible to accomplish the purposes intended by such
covenants."
3
Consideration in a Deed. Section 235.15 formerly stated that it
was the duty of all parties to a real estate conveyance to state as near
as practicable the actual consideration for that conveyance. But even
with that duty imposed, the practice of attorneys in Wisconsin was
to use the stock phrase, "one dollar and other good and valuable con-
sideration," in deeds and other conveyances. The reason was perhaps
that no penalty was provided in case of a breach. Now chapter 553 has
repealed that duty entirely. This is in line with the rules stated in an
early Wisconsin case concerning consideration.4
Conveyance by a Minor Married Woman. As to the right of a
minor married woman to convey property, the Wisconsin statutes
in point prior to 1953 were sections 235.01(1), 235.26, and 235.27.
Section 235.01(1) stated that the conveyance must be signed by one
of lawful age. Section 235.26 stated that every married woman of
the age of eighteen years and upwards may bar her rights of dower
by joining with her husband or his guardian in a deed or by execut-
ing her quit claim deed to the person taking from her husband. From
these statutes the only interest which a minor married woman could
convey or bar was her right of dower. But chapter 567 -has created
section 235.015 which allows a minor married woman to alienate
any right, title or interest she may have in any real estate, including
her right of dower, by joining with her adult husband in an instru-
ment of conveyance. The effect of this is to bind her as though she
were an adult. This section is to supersede any previous provisions
of the law to the contrary.
Dower and Homestead Rights. Section 235.27 allows every
married woman of eighteen years or more to bar her dower rights
by joining with her husband in a conveyance or, if he had lawfully
conveyed to another, by executing a quit claim deed of that land to
the other person. Chapter 494 has amended section 235.27 to allow
a married woman to release her homestead rights in the same manner.
s Ward v. Prospect Manor Corporation, 188 Wis. 534, 206 N.W. 856 (1926);
Burden v. Doucette, 240 Wis. 230, 2 N.W. 2d 204 (1942); Comment, 36 MARQ.
L. REv. 372, 375-376 (1953).
4 Rust v. Fitzhugh, 132 Wis. 549, 112 N.W. 548 (1907).
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That provision appears to be in accord with section 235.01(2) which
states that an alienation by a married man of his homestead is not
valid without his wife's consent. That consent may be shown by her
joining in the conveyance or executing a separate deed to the same
property.
Metes and Bounds Description. The spring session of the
Wisconsin legislature enacted chapter 351 which repealed and re-
created section 236.16. The second subsection required that in order
to convey or contract to convey a parcel of land whose boundaries
were to be specified by metes and bounds, the owner must have the
parcel surveyed, monumented and mapped according to the section.
By the third subsection no such conveyance was valid unless access
to the parcel was provided by a road or street. The fourth subsec-
tion forbade the recording of such a deed unless it was accompanied
by a map approved by the governing body of the city or village having
plat jurisdiction over the land. Chapter 351 also created section
236.165 setting up penalties in case of a violation of section 236.16.
The amendments met with strong disapproval both of individual mem-
bers of the state bar and individual registers of deeds, many of whom
thought the new sections so impractical and unworkable that they
made known their intent not to comply with the provisions. As a re-
sult of this dissatisfaction, the fall session of the legislature, by
chapter 624, repealed the new sections and recreated the old section
in toto.
Property Held by Aliens. Section 234.23, which makes it
unlawful for any person or corporation not a resident of the United
States or one of its territories to own any interest in more than 640
acres of land in Wisconsin, has been liberalized somewhat by chapter
55. The amendment provides that right of way easements of railroad
or pipe line corporations are exempted from the restriction while
being used in the business of such corporation and for ten years
thereafter. The legislature is presumably looking forward to the pos-
sibility that a market for the newly developed Canadian natural gas
resources may be sought in Wisconsin.
Recording Fees. Chapter 174 has increased the recording fees
to be charged by the register of deeds for certain instruments. This
chapter has amended section 59.57(1) (b) to provide higher fees for
the recordation of standard instruments not drawn on an approved
form as well as for instruments for which there is no standard form.
Section 235.16(3) has also been amended to provide for an increased
recording fee on standard instruments even on the approved form
when a rider has been attached.
Property Assessment. Section 70.74(7) (aa) has been created to
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prevent any person from appearing before the board of review or
from otherwise contesting any assessment of real or personal prop-
erty when that person has refused an assessor's reasonable written
request, sent by registered mail, to view the property assessed. 5
Acquisition of Lands for Highways. Section 83.07(4) has been
amended by chapter 308 to provide for notice of the court hearing
on the application for eminent domain to any lienor of record and to
any occupant of the lands sought to be acquired. Formerly, only
the owner of such lands was entitled to this notice. Other provisions
have also been made for the benefit of the lienor by amendment of
section 84.09(2) .6 The money to be paid for property acquired for
public highways by eminent domain is to be paid over to a court of
record in the county where the land is located instead of being paid
directly to the owner. This gives the lienor an opportunity to pro-
cure payment of his lien directly from the court. There is no danger
that the owner will have dissipated the proceeds before the lienor
learns of the sale of the land securing his claim. Section 84.09(2)
further provides that the owner and lienor may join in a written
direction to the highway committee or town board stating to whom
the proceeds are to be paid. In this event, the money need not be paid
over to a court of record but may be paid directly as specified in
the direction. Of course, if there is more than one lienor of record,
they must all join in such written direction.
Sale of Real Estate by an Executor. Chapter 140 has amended
sections 316.03 and 316.10 which relate to the sale of realty belong-
ing to a decedent's estate by the executor or administrator. Previously
these statutes 7 mentioned a sale of such real estate only when the
sale was necessary; that is, when the sale of the personal property in
the estate was not sufficient to pay the debts and expenses of the
estate. The statutes as amended include a sale that is "for the best
interests of the estate or the heirs" as determined by the county
court.
However, the amendment actually makes no change in the law.
Section 316.01, which is the general authorization for the sale of real
estate by executors and administrators, has long provided for the
sale of real estate when the sale of personalty would be "inimical to
the interests of the estate" and, in the very words of the amendment,
when the sale of real estate would be "for the best interests of the
estate" or the heirs.8 Section 316.02, which sets forth the require-
5 Chapter 207.
6 This section was also amended by chapter 308.
7 Section 316.03 relates to the hearing on a petition to sell realty belonging to the
estate. Section 316.10 deals with the court order authorizing sale of realty
belonging to the estate.
8 Chapter 122 of the Session Laws of 1933 added this language to section 316.01.
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ments of the administrator's petition for license to sell real estate,
provides that such petition may state how the sale is for the best in-
terests of the estate or the heirs. The amendments merely include
in sections 316.03 and 316.10 the provisions which previously had
to be read into them by implication from the preceding sections.
Sale of Real Estate Awarded Under Divorce Decree. Section
247.375 has been added to the statutes dealing with divorce by chap-
ter 495. Under the new section, a person who was awarded real
property in a divorce proceding may, after judgment of divorce has
been decreed but before it has become final, be granted permission
to dispose of such realty free of any claim or interest of the op-
posite party. However, the court may require that part of the pro-
ceeds of the disposition be used to secure payment of a sum for the
benefit of either party or their children. The purpose of the amend-
ment apparently is to facilitate the sale of real property by one
whose title derives from an interlocutory decree of divorce, free of
the possibility of the title being affected by a subsequent vacation or
amendment of the decree.
Cross Reference:
CREDITORS RIGHTS, Carriers Lien for Storage or Transportation.
CREDITORS RIGHTS, Release of Certain Liens.
CRIMINAL LAW, Public Nuisances.
TORTS, Unfair Competition.
WILLS AND PROBATE, Specific Performance of Decendents Con-
tracts.
TORTS
Service on Owner of Water-Craft. Chapter 175 created 30.10
which allows service of process on a nonresident owner or operator
of water-craft, which causes injury to person or property in this
state, by mailing a copy of the original summons to the secretary of
state with a $2.00 fee, provided a copy of the service is sent by reg-
istered mail to the defendant and the defendant's return receipt and
an affadavit by plaintiff or his attorney as to compliance with this
section are filed. 30.10(3) places upon the person in charge of such
water-craft the duty to report to the sheriff of the county where it
occurred within twenty-four hours of such accident the names and
addresses of the owners and all those on board at the time of the ac-
cident with brief statement of the facts of the accident. If he
fails to do this, a fine is imposed. As to venue in such case, 30.10(1)
states that it is the county in which the accident occurred and the
presence of the water-craft there with the damage done and the sub-
9Section 247.26 provides for such awards.
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sequent removal of the water-craft from the state shall act as a
waiver of an objection to venue by the owner and operator if the
case is brought in a proper court in Wisconsin.
Misbranding and Adulteration of Foods. Section 97.60 has been
repealed and recreated by chapter 198. This section deals with the
misbranding of foods and in its new form defines package as a
closed container or wrapper thereby solving the difficulty raised in
an early Wisconsin case.' It also sets up with considerable particu-
larity the duties of one labeling food and its consequent requirements.
Chapter 421 amended 97.25(3) dealing with the adulteration of
food and drugs and renumbered it 97.25(2). This section substan-
tially changes the provision regarding a food containing any added
substance which is poisonous or injurious to health and limiting it
by excepting added substances when the quantity of that substance
does not ordinarily render it injurious to health or if the addition
of the substance is required and cannot be avoided in the manufactur-
ing of the product. 2 The chapter also created 97.25(3) which limits
the application of this theory of adulteration in the cases of compound
foods.
State Aircraft Liability. Chapter 244 created section 114.065
which establishes liability on the state for damage occasioned by
the negligent operation of aircraft owned and operated by the .state,
which damage is caused in the performance of state business, if a
claim or notice of intent to file claim is filed in ninety days after
the accident according to section 15.18(8) .3 This must contain a state-
ment of the facts on which the claim is based. The attorney general
then reports on this to the legislature who passes on the claim or, if no
action is taken by the legislature in sixty days after presentment, it
shall constitute disallowance which bars any action based on the claim
unless brought within six months after disallowance. This covers all
business of the state whether governmental or proprietary and is an
extension of the usual limit of state liability for the torts of em-
ployees which is limited to proprietary functions. 4
Unfair Competition. Chapter 415 created 207.04(3) which makes
it an unfair method of competition for one who is in the business
of financing the purchase of real estate to require as a condition pre-
'M. Carpenter Baking Co. v. Dept. of Agriculture and Markets, 217 Wis. 196,
257 N.W. 606 (1935) which under a previous statute differentiated between
receptacle, wrapper, and package following 3 O.A.G. 915 (1913). See also,
Golden Harvest Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Agriculture and Markets, 232 Wis. 240,
286 N.W. 868 (1939).
2 Under the less explicit statute, see, Dairy Queen of Wisconsin v. McDowell.
260 Wis. 471, 51 N.W. 2d 236 (1951) and 41 O.A.G. 135 (1952).
399 A.L.R. 187 (1927) mentions a New York Court of Claims case which under
a similar statute allowed recovery. No other cases are available.
4 Apfelbacher v. State, 160 Wis. 656, 152 N.W. 144 (1915).
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cedent to the financing the purchase that the person for whom the
purchase is to be made negotiate a policy of insurance or renewal
thereof covering that property through a particular insurance agent
or broker. Chapter 415 also created 207.04(4) which makes it un-
fair for a person selling real or personal property, or a person or firm
engaged in that business, to require such a condition precedent to a
sale.5
Notice of Injury. Chapter 444 amended 330.19(5) providing for
a notice of injury to the person within two years after its happening,
by stating that the purpose of that statute was to prevent prosecution
of claims after investigation of the facts upon which they are based
has become difficult. It further provides that any notice is sufficient
if it advises the party addressed of the principal facts on which the
claim is based and it substantially meets the other requirements of
330.19(5). This purpose had been generally agreed upon prior to this
new enactment.6
Cross Reference:
CRIM INAL LAw, Public Nuisances.
MOTOR VEHICLES, Safety Responsibility Law.
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
Burial Contracts as Trusts. Chapter 291 creates section 156.125
which relates to prearranged funeral plan agreements. Prior to the
creation of this section, no funeral company could sell any certificate
providing for burial benefits;1 section 156.125 allows a trust ar-
rangement pursuant to an agreement with a funeral company for
services to be rendered after the death of the decedent. Either the
person, for whose benefit the funds are paid, or the funeral company
can deposit the funds in the name of the person for whose benefiit
the funds are paid in trust for the funeral company. Such trust ac-
count is revocable during the life of the depositor only after notice
to the designated beneficiary. After the death of the depositor, the
funeral company can collect the funds after written notice to the
bank that it has complied with the underlying agreement.
The depositor is assured of getting funeral arrangements accord-
ing to his wishes. The funds to be used cannot be reached by creditors
of the depositor since they are in trust for the benefit of the funeral
company. The depositor is protected because neither the funeral com-
pany nor its creditors can reach the funds unless the agreement has
been carried out. The funeral company, moreover, can prevent any
5 The constitutionality of these sections is discussed in 42 O.A.G. 137 (1953).6 Nelson v. American Employer's Insurance Co., 262 Wis. 271, 55 N.W. 2d 213
(1952): Ullman v. Freye, 263 Wis. 199, 56 N.W. 2d 821 (1952) ; 1952 Wis. L.
Ry. 105.
'Wis. STATs. (1951) §156.12(7).
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breach of the underlying agreement by the depositor since it must
have notice before the depositor can withdraw the funds during his
lifetime.
Trust Fund Investments. Section 320.01(4) of the statutes has
been amended by chapter 164. The section is no longer limited to
original investments in and retention of single premium endowment
insurance policies and single premium annuities. The person authorized
to invest the funds of the trust may, with the approval of the court,
retain and make original investments in annuities, endowment policies,
life insurance policies and accident and health policies benefiting the
beneficiary of the trust or the ward or their dependents.2 Generally,
under section 320.01, a trustee could invest in these classes of securities
if he was given such power in the instrument under which he was
acting. By reason of the amendment, a trustee, not otherwise auth-
orized, may now take steps to protect beneficiaries, the ward or their
dependents without being limited to single premium policies. Under
the old law the trust assets in many cases were not sufficient to permit
single premium policies to be taken out and still allow the trustee
to adequately fulfill his obligations as trustee. Under the new section,
a beneficiary or his dependents can be protected without forcing the
trustee to exhaust the funds at his disposal.
Valuation of Trust Assets. A new section, 320.09, has been
created by chapter 228. Section 320.09(2) lays down the test to be
used in evaluating assets of a fund. Market values are to be used as
revealed by published market quotations and, when these are un-
available, such other sources of information may be used as are
fair and reasonable. It appears that the general custom of investment
brokers and banking institutions would be acceptable tests. The test
is to be used whenever it is necessary to determine the value of in-
vestments for the purposes of chapter 320 of the statutes. The mean-
ing given to the term "value" has been subject to change in Wisconsin
in the last twenty years.3 Section 320.09(2) now prescribes a test
which is more definite.
Retention of Fluctuating Investments. Under section 320.09 (1),
a sale or liquidation of an investment is not required solely by reason
of a change in the relative values of investments eligible under chapter
2See, Will of Yates, 259 Wis. 263, 48 N.W. 2d 601 (1951), holding that trust
investments are governed by the statutes in force when the investment is
made rather than statutes in force when the trust was created.
3 See, In re Karkowski's Estate, 220 Wis. 45, 264 N.W. 487 (1936) for the
meaning given to the term "actual value" as it was used in an earlier statute;
Estate of George, 225 Wis. 251, 257, 270 N.W. 538, 274 N.W. 294 (1937) (no
specified meaning given to the term "value") ; Welch v. Welch, infra, note 8
at 316 (Market value used as the test).
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320 of the statutes. Section 320.02 contains the limitations as to in-
vestments and is still applicable when an original investment of trust
funds is made. However, this section does not now apply to retention
of investments-and require a sale of securities merely because of a
change in the value of investments. Section 320.05 has allowed a trus-
tee to retain securities, regardless of changed market conditions, which
would bring into operation the provisions of section 320.02, but the
trustee had to obtain the approval of the county court. The court was
required to limit the allowed period of retention in its order. Such
recourse to the county court no longer appears to be necessary to avoid
absolute liability for loss, but still may be desirable to avoid liability for
negligently retaining such securities since the creation of section
320.09(1) only affects the duty of care of a trustee in one important
aspect.
A trustee is negligent in the handling of trust funds if he orig-
inally invests them contrary to the provisions of chapter 320 and
thereafter the value of the trust fund is lessened. 4 When the validity
of the original investment cannot be questioned, the trustee has not
been held surchargeable for any loss if he could not exchange the
investments except to the detriment of the trust.5 However, the
trustee, in the exercise of his discretion, is still bound by the law re-
lating to the duties of trustees.
A trustee must exercise more than ordinary diligence and vigilance
in the management of a trust estate. Good faith alone will not pro-
tect a trustee; he must also exercise diligence, prudence and absolute
fidelity.6 In Wisconsin trustees are bound by a strict rule in reference
to their liability.7 In the exercise of their discretion, they are required
to act as prudent and provident persons would act under the same
or similar circumstances.8 Where a trustee is given broad powers of
discretion in the instrument creating the trust, he is not bound by
the provisions of chapter 320 of the Statutes as to the retention of
investments or the making of new ones.9 When a trustee is not given
broad powers of discretion, he is bound by chapter 320. The creation
of section 320.09(1) merely allows the trustee to use good business
judgment when investments are subject to a decline in values with-
out a time consuming petition to the county court. The duty of care
4 In re Matter of Filardo, 221 Wis. 589, 601, 267 N.W. 312 (1936); Estate of
George, 225 Wis. 251, 257, 270 N.W. 538, 274 N.W. 294 (1937).
5 Estate of West, 231 Wis. 377, 389, 284 N.W. 565 (1939).
6 Estate of Allis, 191 Wis. 23, 29, 209 N.W. 945, 210 N.W. 418 (1926) ; see also
Matter of Filardo, 221 Wis. 589, 596, 267 N.W. 312 (1936) on the duty of a
fiduciary acting for himself.
7 1945 Wis. L. REv. 499. This article presents the practical problems facing a
trustee under the Wis. investment statutes.8 Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 314, 290 N.W. 758, 293 N.W. 150 (1940).
9 Ibid. at 313.
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of a trustee has not been changed; the area of discretion under the
statutes has been broadened. In determining the liability of a trustee,
the administration of the estate must be viewed in the light of the
powers conferred by the instrument creating the trust, as well as
in the light of the duties and liabilities imposed by law.10
Appearances by Guardians. The legislature has amended
sections 260.22 and 324.29(1) of the statutes by chapter 298 of the
Laws of 1953. Prior to the amendment" a minor, who was a party
to a circuit court action as defined in 260.01, had to appear by a
guardian ad litem. Under the new law a minor, or incompetent, may
appear either by his general guardian or by a guardian ad litem.
The amendment of section 324.29(1) makes the same change so
that any person under disability may conduct or defend a proceeding
in a county court by a guardian ad litem or by the general guardian
of his property, who may appear by attorney.
By amendment to both sections, a guardian ad litem shall be
appointed in all cases where there is no general guardian, or where
the general guardian fails to appear or where the interest of the ward
is adverse to that of the general guardian. A ward still must have
some interest in the action before he is entitled to have a guardian
ad litem appointed to appear for him' 2 under either of the two sections.
Formal Accounting by Guardians and Trustees. Section 324.356
has been created by chapter 299. It allows the judge, at any time, to
require an accounting by any guardian or trustee at a hearing. This
does not apply to an intervivos trust.' 3 The hearing may be had upon
the motion of the court or by the petition of any interested party.14
Notice must be given to all interested parties, including sureties on
the bond of a guardian or trustee. Such sureties, to protect themselves,
may now petition the court once every three years for such a hear-
ing. Prior to this change, a general guardian was required to file an
account at least once a year,' 5 a testamentary trustee had to file
annually' and an accounting by a trustee of an intervivos trust was
and still is possible under the general equity jurisdiction of a circuit
court.' 7 Presumably there has been a question in the past as to whether
a surety on the bond of a guardian or trustee was an interested party
and thus would be able to petition the county court under section
324.351 for an accounting by the guardian or trustee. The present
10 Estate of Allis, supra, note 3 at 32.
"Wis. STATS. (1951) §260.22; Will of Jaeger, 218 Wis. 1, 10, 259 N.W. 842
(1935).
12 Estate of Austin, 258 Wis. 578, 582, 46 N.W. 2d 861 (1951).
13 Estate of George, supra, note 4 at 262.
L4WIs. STATS. (1951) §324.351.
15 WIS. STATS. (1951) §§319.11, 319.12.
'6 Wis. STATS. (1951) §§323.01, 323.07, 317.06.
17Whitford v. Moehlenpah, 196 Wis. 10, 219 N.W. 361 (1928).
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change no longer leaves room for doubt on this point. The surety is
classed as an interested party and may petition once every three
years for a 'hearing. The change appears to allow a court to exercise
more strict supervision of trustees and guardians.
Share Accounts in Savings and Loan Associations. Chapter 465
creates section 215.18. Section 215.18 relates to share accounts of
minor females in trust purchased from any association doing busi-
ness in the state. Prior to the creation of this section, a share ac-
count in a savings and loan association could be held in trust only
for a minor under fourteen years of age. Any minor above fourteen
years of age could own a share account, but was subject to the same
duties and liabilities as an adult member.' Under the new law when
a minor female is or thereafter becomes a married woman, the share
shall be held for her exclusive right and benefit, free from the con-
trol or lien of all persons except creditors. Any dividends are to be
paid to the person in whose name the shares are issued. The receipt
of such minor or female is a sufficient release or discharge of the
share account. When a share account is purchased in trust for another,
and no other notice of a valid trust is given in writing to an associa-
tion, in the event of the death of the trustee the association may pay
the person for whom the share account was purchased any dividends
or any part of the principal; under prior law the trust presumably
would not terminate, but the successor of the deceased trustee would
have title. The amendment provides a method by which a share may
be paid to a beneficiary without forcing the savings and loan associa-
tion to participate in the accounting for a deceased trustee.
Notice of Hearing in Common Trust Fund Accounting. Chapter
487 amends section 223.055(2) of the Uniform Common Trust Fund
Act relating to notice of a hearing of an accounting in common
trust funds. When the bank or trust company operating a common
trust fund presents an account for approval, the court shall assign a
time and place for hearing. Notice of such hearing must be given
according to section 223.055(2), i.e., by publication once a week for
three weeks, first publication to be not less than twenty days prior
to the date of hearing and in a paper published in the county where
the bank or trust company has its principal office. Notice must also
be given by mail, at least fourteen days prior to the hearing, to all
the beneficiaries participating in the common trust fund whose names
are known to the bank or trust company.
It appears certain that the statutory change is a result of the de-
cision in the Mullane case,19 where it was held that notice by pub-
' WIS. STATS. (1951) §215.16.
29 339 U.S. 306 (1950), see 34 MARQ. L. REv. 120 for the effect of the Mullane
case on Wisconsin practice.
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lication to known beneficiaries was insufficient. Notice must be given
by mail to beneficiaries whose residence is known to the bank or trust
company. The amendment makes the Wisconsin statute accord with
the practice made necessary by the Mullane case.
Conveyance by Trustee. Chapter 530 creates section 231.201
relating to trustee's powers which are not of record. The trustee is
now conclusively presumed to be a trustee of a valid express trust
and has the full power of conveyance. In order to have the benefit
of the above presumption, the title of record must be in such person
as trustee. The new section seems to be a method by which record
title to property may be conveyed without needless objection. If any
settlor does not wish to allow a trustee to have the power to convey,
the trust agreement will have to be recorded showing such pro-
hibition.
Chapter 531 repeals section 235.501. This repeal was necessary
since the new section 231.201, noted above, provides that a deed
to A as trustee is 'a conveyance to a trustee. Under the repealed sec-
tion, 235.501, a conveyance to A as trustee vested the absolute title
in A and the term "trustee" could be ignored in dealing with A. This
raised a question as to the validity of a restriction on the power of a
trustee to convey, even though the trust instrument containing the
restriction was recorded.
Cross Reference:
WILLS AND PROBATE, Personal Representative.
WILLS AND PROBATE, Summary Settlement of Small Estates.
WILLS AND PROBATE
Inmate of a Prison. A new section of the Statutes has been
created, namely 53.14.1 Under this section, the estate of an inmate of
a prison, if such estate is $150 or less, can be distributed by the
warden to the nearest kin, provided the estate is in the trust of the
warden and he, or other designated officials, determines that no pro-
bate proceedings are necessary.
Time for Filing Claims. Chapter 258 of the Laws of 1953
amends section 313.03(1) of the Statutes so as to allow an extension
of time for the filing of claims in the probate of an estate. The claim-
ant may now file not later than 60 days after the time originally
limited for filing claims. The statute is now comparable to the law
as it existed before 1951.2 When the statute was changed in 1951,
it was hoped that the settlement of estates would be facilitated.3 The
L. 1953, c. 71; see also Wis. STATS. (1951) §§4926(11), 103.39(2) for other
methods of settling certain estates without court proceedings.
2 WIS. STATS. (1949) §313.03(1).
3L. 1951, c. 639, Wis. STATS. (1951) §313.03(1); 35 MARQ. L. Rv. 164.
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legal profession was dissatisfied with the effect of the change4 since,
in practice, the settlement of many estates was delayed. Under the
law, as it now stands, an executor is enabled to file his final account
after the 60-day period and be assured that it will not have to be
changed because a previously unknown creditor happens to present
his claim shortly before the final account is filed.
Allowances to Widows in Preference to Creditors. Chapter 259,
Laws of 1953, liberalizes section 313.15(4) (a) of the Statutes so
as to allow, in the discretion of the county court, a sum or value
not exceeding $2000 for the support of a widow with no minor
children before payment of expenses or claims against decedent. Prior
to this amendment, allowance for support was to be made only for
the use and support of the widow and minor children of the deceased;
and if there was no widow, for the support of the minor children.5
Personal Representatives. Extensive changes have been made
by Chapter 300, Laws of 1953. The general purpose of the chapter
appears to be to streamline and consolidate previous law. Sections
311.08, 311.09(7), 311.10(3) and 312.01 of the Statutes have been
amended; 310.14, 310.15, 310.20 and 311.04 have been repealed and
recreated and section 324.001 has been created.
Section 324.001 provides that the term "personal representative,"
as used in all proceedings in county courts, shall include an executor,
administrator, special administrator, administrator de bonis non, ad-
ministrator with the will annexed, ancillary administrator and public
administrator, when the latter is administering an estate, but does
not include a guardian or trustee.6
The evident purpose of this section is to group, under one desig-
nation, all persons whose functions in county court proceedings fall
in the same general class. It does not appear that the legislature in-
tended section 324.001 to have any specific relation to section 324.01.
Therefore the question left unanswered in Estate of White,7 as to
whether an administrator de bonis non can appeal, remains unsolved.
Section 324.001 applies only to those sections which use the term
"personal representative."
Section 310.14 has been repealed and recreated. It provides for
the duties of the personal representative. He is to collect and possess
decedent's personal estate and administer the same, except for the
widow's allowance as provided under section 313.15(1). Thus, any
4 Repeal of the 1951 amendment was urged by the Real Property and Probate
Practice and Procedure Committee of the Milwaukee Bar Association. The
Gavel, June 1952, p. 26; Id., September 1953, p. 29.5 WIs. STATS. (1951) §313.15(4) (a).
6 L. 1953, c. 300 §1.
7 256 Wis. 467, 41 N.W. 2d 776 (1950).
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personal representative as defined in section 324.001 now has express
authority for the collection of the decendent's personal estate.8
Section 310.15, providing for the bond of a personal representa-
tive, now sets a minimum level for the bond as equal to the estimated
value of the personal property plus one year's income from real
estate. Under section 310.15(4), if a will requests that an executor
serve without bond, the judge may grant the request. The judge may
still require a bond and, under the newly created section, a creditor
or interested person may request that a bond be given. The judge
still has discretion to grant or deny such request.
By amendment to section 312.01 the personal representative must
include in his inventory, for tax purposes, life insurance, joint and life
tenancies and gifts made in contemplation of death or taking effect
upon death,.or made within two years prior to death."
The appointment of appraisers for the estate may now be made
by the judge in chambers rather than in open court. To eliminate
duplication, section 312.01 now provides that where a special ad-
ministrator has filed an inventory and appraisal, no other personal
representative need do so unless additional property is found or the
judge orders otherwise. The transfer of the estate of decendent
can be accomplished quickly, yet will be controlled so as to protect
the rights of all persons concerned.
Inheritance by Adopted Persons. Section 322.07(4) of the
Statutes has been amended and section 322.07(5) has been created
by Chapter 398 of the Laws of 1953. Section 322.07(4) now pro-
vides that the adopted person does not lose the right to inherit from
his natural relatives. The new section alters the rights of adopted
persons drastically. Under the ruling in Estate of Ries,10 an adopted
person could not inherit from his natural relatives except in the
one case provided for, namely from his parents.1" This ruling carried
out the purpose of the statute to completely change the legal status
of the adopted person from that of a child of the natural parents to
that of a child of the adoptive parents. By reason of the change now
enacted, the adopted person can inherit from other relatives of his
natural family.
The creation of section 322.07(5)12 supplements the amendment
above noted. The new section reads:
"The adopted person shall inherit from his adoptive relatives
in the same manner as from his natural relatives."
S Supra, note 6, §2.
9 Supra, note 6, §9.
10259 Wis. 453, 49 N.W. 2d 483, 50 N.W. 2d 397 (1951).
lWis. STATS. (1951) §322.07(4).
22L. 1951, c. 398, §2.
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The effect of the two sections is to enable an adopted person to in-
herit from two families, his natural and adoptive relatives.
The changes enacted by chapter 398, in effect, overrule the
holding in Estate of Bradley.1 3 In that case the court held that an
adopted person could not inherit from his adoptive relatives under
the statute as it then existed. The court, however, refused to de-
cide whether a statute worded differently would be valid if it .gave
the adopted person the right to inherit from adoptive relatives. The
court stated:
"... authorities do not go to the extent of denying to the legis-
lature the power of prescribing a course of descent which will
take property of deceased persons out of the current of their
blood. That is a question which is not here, and upon which
we very carefully refrain from expressing any opinion.... We
are now emphasizing the fact that to accomplish such pur-
pose the legislature should use explicit and unmistakable lan-
guage."
Whether the change, allowing an adopted person to inherit from
his adoptive relatives, is constitutional is an open question. Clearly
the legislature can regulate the right to take property by inheritance
or will.1 4 The outer limits of this regulatory power are not clear.
Escheats of Unclaimed Legacies. Chapter 479 amends section
318.03(1) and (2). The new section, 318.03(1), includes legacies
as well as intestate property, so that if either the legacy or the inte-
state property is not claimed within 120 days after entry of final judg-
ment, they shall escheat to the state. Presumably the ruling in Estate of
Rade, 5 that an heir does have sufficient interest in an unclaimed
share of intestate property to be reached by his creditors, also ap-
plies to unclaimed legacies. The amendment to section 318.03(2),
moreover, clears up the meaning to be given to the term "foreign
legatee." The new section relates to a legatee or heir resident of a
foreign country. If the required notice is given to such heir or legatee
and the property to be distributed to him is not claimed, then the
property descends as intestate property and does not escheat. Thus
it appears that the only property which shall escheat to the state under
section 318.03 is property not claimed by an heir or legatee who
is a resident either of Wisconsin or of some other state of the United
States. The test to be applied is the residence of the heir or legatee.
Specific Performance of Decedent's Contracts. Section 316.235
(2) of the statutes has been repealed by section 6, Chapter 440 of
the Laws of 1953. Prior to the repeal of this section, the assets of
13 185 Wis. 393, 201 N.W. 937 (1925) ; see also Estate of Matzke, 250 Wis. 204,
26 N.W. 2d 659 (1947).
14 Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 202, 108 N.W. 627 (1906).
15 259 Wis. 169, 47 N.W. 2d 891 (1951) ; see also 35 MARQ. L. REv. 164.
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the estate were liable for any claim based on a breach of warranty
if such claim was made before distribution. If the claim was made
after distribution, the persons taking a distributive share of such
estate were liable in proportion to the share of the estate received
by each. Every conveyance by an executor or administrator was
construed to include a warranty of good title except as to those mat-
ters mentioned in the conveyance. Thus, a question arose as to whether
an executor or administrator could ever convey by quitclaim deed. 16
It would appear that, under the new statute, a vendee has only
a limited right of action for a breach of warranty when there has been
performance of a contract to convey made by a decendent. The ex-
ecutor, administrator or testamentary trustee is not personally liable
for any breach of warranty.'7 The right of a vendee to follow the
proceeds into the hands of a distributee was not retained in the new
statute. Evidently, the vendee can only bring an action for breach
of warranty against the estate prior to distribution. Section 316.54
provides, in substance, that a warranty deed given pursuant to a
contract of a decendent to convey shall have the same effect as if
the deceased were still living and had then executed the warranty
deed. In that case, if there were a breach of warranty, the vendee
would have a claim he could enforce against the estate. It appears
that this is the only right a vendee now has for any breach of a war-
ranty in a deed given by an executor, administrator or testamentary
trustee pursuant to a contract to convey made by a decendent.
Under the newly created section 316.54, the court alone, by its
judgment, may pass title to land subject to a contract to convey.
Section 316.54 also provides that when a decendent contracted to
convey by warranty deed, an executor, adminstrator or testamentary
trustee shall convey by warranty deed subject to any exceptions in
the contract to convey made by the decendent. When decendent had
contracted to convey by quitclaim deed, it appears that the safest
procedure would be to allow the court to pass title by its judgment
alone, although the court may require any proper person to convey
apparently in accordance with the terms of the decendent's contract.
Sunmmary Settlement of Small Estates: Determination of
Heirship. Chapter 661 of the Laws of 1953 amends section 311.05
relating to summary settlement of small estates. In certain cases pro-
vided for in section 311.05, the executor or administrator may pay
the named allowances and preferred claims and distribute the estate
accordingly. The executor may then file his final account and the
estate may be settled. In the interest of swift settlement, the amend-
16WIs. STATS. (1951) §216235(2).
'TWis. STATS. (1953) §316.54.
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ment provides that where there is no real estate it is not necessary
to determine heirship. (Presumably this -has no effect on jointly
held property.) The question remains whether an estate can be
settled without a determniation of heirship in certain types of per-
sonal property. No question of title is likely to be raised in connec-
tion with tangible personal property.
A more serious problem confronts an executor or administrator
when the decendent owns securities which have to be transferred.
Normally, the corporation will not transfer securities on its books
unless proof of heirship is presented. Such proof can easily be ob-
tained when proper proceedings are taken.18 If this latter action is
necessary, the amendment of section 311.05 does not aid the swift
settlement of these estates in many cases. A remedy for this problem is
available if a county court is willing to apply sections 311.055(2) and
(3) so as to direct the transfer of securities registered in the name
of deceased and release persons mhking the transfer from liability.
These latter sections on their face do not seem to apply to a section
311.05 proceeding. If they do not, the amendment has little value
when a decendent owned securities at his death, but wil facilitate
administration when no objection is made to a transfer of personal
property without determination of heirship.
Cross Reference:
PROPERTY, Sale of Real Estate by an Executor.
WORKMEN'S COMPE-NSATION
Persons Covered. Several significant changes in the statutes
dealing with workmen's compensation have been made by chapter
328. Members of the state and national guards have been excluded
from coverage under workmen's compensation when they are covered
by federal regulations which are substantially equivalent.1
Liability of an employer under the workmen's compensation laws
has been extended to include injuries sustained by an employee while
in the immediate vicinity of the employer's premises on his way to or
from work if the injury results from an occurrence on the premises.
Such injuries are deemed to have been incurred while the employee
was performing services incidental to his employment.2 The employer's
liability in cases where the employee was going to or from work
was previously limited to injuries sustained while the employee was
actually on the employer's premises (unless the employer is under
an obligation to transport the employee home).3 The amendment may
'sWis. STATS. (1951) §230.48(1).
:WIs. STATS. (1953), §102.07(9).
2WIS. STATS. (1953), §102.03(1) (c).
3 Githens v. Industrial Commission, 220 Wis. 658, 265 N.W. 662 (1936).
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be commendable inasmuch as it gives the employee greater protec-
tion, but unfortunately it introduces a great deal of ambiguity into
the statute. It will be difficult to exact a definite standard from such
terms as "in the immediate vicinity of the employer's premises" and
"an occurrence on the premises."
Maximum Weekly Wage Basis Increase.. The maximum weekly
wage basis for computing compensation has been increased from
$52.86 to $60.00 in the case of permanent total disability. The basis
for permanent partial disability is still $52.86.4 Previously there was
no distinction made between total and partial disability in respect
to the basis.
Death Benefits. The additional death benefit for dependent
children of the deceased has been reduced. The benefit is now limited
to children up to sixteen years of age. A child one year old will
receive an amount equal to one and one-fifteenth times the average
annual income of the deceased parent and this amount is reduced by
one-sixteenth for each additional year of age of the child.5 The ad-
ditional death benefit had just been increased by the legislature at its
1951 session.6 Apparently that increase was too great because the
fund used to pay the additional death benefits has been supplemented
by increasing the maximum amount payable to the state treasury, in
case the decendent left no one wholly dependent on him for support,
from $3000 to $4000. This fund is used to pay the additional death
benefits for dependent children.7
Burial Expenses. Burial expenses for the deceased employee
payable by the employer have been increased from $300 to $350.8
Deafness. Although the statutes have provided for benefits for
loss of hearing due to industrial causes since 1919, no claim had been
filed for any such impairment before 1950 except when there was a
resulting loss of time or wages. In 1950 the industrial commission
made an award for loss of hearing although the applicant's employ-
ment and wages were not diminished by the injury. Hundreds of other
claims have been filed since that time. A test case taken to the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has confirmed the legality of such awards.9
Meanwhile, the legislature has passed chapter 328 amending the
workmen's compensation provisions covering the loss of hearing. The
4Ws. STATS. (1953), §102.11(1).
5WIs. STATS. (1953), §102.49(1).
eSee Buellesbach, Binzak, and Boden, Survey of 1951 Wisconsin Legislation,
35 MARQ. L. Rav. 121 (1951) at 172.
7WIs. STATS. (1953), §102.49(5).
sWis. STATS. (1953), §102.50.
9Green Bay Drop Forge Company v. Industrial Commission, 265 Wis. 38,
60 N.W. 2d 409 (1953). This case was petitioned for rehearing by the Green
Bay Drop Forge Company. Several other firms filed briefs as amici curii, but
the rehearing was denied.
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disability schedule has been amended to provide benefits for deafness
only when caused by "accident or sudden trauma."10 Loss of hearing
caused by "prolonged exposure to noise in his employment" has been
included in section 102.565 dealing with nondisabling silicosis. This
section provides for compensation not exceeding $3500 but only if the
employee is discharged by the employer because of the condition.
The amendment does not solve the problem entirely, however.
There still remains the question of whether the amendment will be
given retroactive effect. The Supreme Court refused to pass on this
question when it denied a motion for rehearing in the Green Bay
case."' Cases pending when the new statute took effect would probably
not be affected.1 2 The main problem is whether claims may still be
filed for loss of hearing incurred before the amendment became ef-
fective. If such claims are allowed, many more cases may be ex-
pected.
Penalty for Violation of Statute. When an injury to an
employee is caused by failure of the employer to comply with a
statute, the benefits to the employee are increased by fifteen per cent.
The legislature has provided that when the employer fails to reason-
ably enforce compliance with the statute by his employees this shall
constitute failure by the employer himself to comply, and is therefor
a ground for invoking the fifteen per cent penalty.' 3
Compromise of Claims. When the spouse of a deceased
employee compromises her claim for death benefits, section 102.64(1)
now provides that the claim of the employee's children (under sec-
tion 102.49) will automatically be compromised on the same pro rata
basis.
1OWis. STATS. (1953), §102.52(17) and (18).
"'Supra, note 10.
'
2 The amendment took effect on July 1, 1953. At that time there were already
five hundred claims for compensation for loss of hearing pending before the
industrial commission.
13 Wis. STATS. (1953), §102.57.
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